The Formation of Early Helenic Nationalism and the Special Symbolic and Material Interests  of the New Radical Republican Intelligentsia (ca. 1790-1830) by Petmezas, Socrates D.
   





  The Formation of Early Helenic Nationalism and
the Special Symbolic and Material Interests of the
New Radical Republican Intelligentsia (ca.
1790-1830)
Petmezas Socrates  
https://doi.org/10.12681/historein.126
 
  Copyright © 2012 Socrates D. Petmezas 
   
  
   
To cite this article:
Petmezas, S. (2000). The Formation of Early Helenic Nationalism and the Special Symbolic and Material Interests of the
New Radical Republican Intelligentsia (ca. 1790-1830). Historein, 1, 51-74. doi:https://doi.org/10.12681/historein.126
















Socrates D. Petmezas 
Introduction: stating the problem 
The early formation and rapid diffusion of an 
active and mobilising Hellenic national 
consciousness is a question social scientists 
have to confront when studying the creation 
of the Greek nation-state after a long and 
successful revolutionary war of 
independence (1821 -1830).2 The formulation 
of a concomitant Hellenic "national idea," 
directly inspired by the Enlightenment, was 
already completed at the beginning of the 
19th century. Many Greek historians consider 
that the "revival of Greek national 
consciousness" started as early as the 13th 
century and matured, thanks to the so-called 
Greek Enlightenment, in the 18th.3 I think, 
however, that we should differentiate the 
novel Hellenic national idea from the older 
ecumenical identity of the Greek-Orthodox 
Christians in the Balkans and western 
Anatolia.4 This last group formed the multi-
ethnic and multi-cultural congregation under 
the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the 
patriarchate of Constantinople, self-termed 
as "Romaic", meaning Roman (that is post-
Byzantine) and Greek-Orthodox. The 
patriarchate and the dominant classes in the 
Greek-Orthodox community considered 
themselves to be the legitimate heirs of 
Byzantium (that is of the Christian Eastern 
Roman Empire) and of the Hellenic cultural 
legacy as embodied in the Greek-Orthodox 
ecclesiastical literary tradition.5 A "proto-
national"6 consciousness existed before the 
18th century, but it was a Romaic one, 
clearly distinct from the Hellenic which, as an 
imagined community, would be constituted 
at its expense.7 
There are two versions explaining the war of 
independence in modern Greek 
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historiography. The traditional "historicist" approach simply 
left aside the problem of national formation and thought in 
terms of a natural "Revival of the Greek Nation" and of its 
"self-evident and legitimate" aspiration to political 
independence.8 Furthermore, the Greek-Orthodox church, 
although described as a conservative - and sometimes 
intolerant - institution, was thought to be of strategic 
importance for the conservation of national-religious 
consciousness and for the diffusion of modern learning in 
Greece.9 The other version ascribed the so-called "Greek 
national revival" and the adoption of the ideas of the 
Enlightenment to the rise of a Greek mercantile bourgeoisie 
and diaspora and their needs for a unified economic area.10 
These two approaches, largely inspired by Eurocentric 
interpretative models, are no longer satisfactory. The 
national(ist) historicist historiography is the direct product of the same process of national 
formation that it tries to examine. The theoretical prerequisite of historicism is that the nation, as 
a "natural" entity whose origins are lost in the dawn of time, is its privileged object of study. 
Recent development in the social sciences, which refutes the primordiality of national and ethnic 
links and posits the modernity of nations as a social and political phenomenon, denies the 
foundations upon which historicism, as a historiographie school, relies. The second approach 
was initiated by both liberal and Marxist historians who considered that the formation of modern 
nation-states in Western Europe and the development and diffusion of national ideas were 
directly linked to bourgeois interests for a unified internal market, a strong and rational state 
apparatus, a homogenous cultural-linguistic space and, sometimes, a secular and 
representative government. Nevertheless, as one moves towards central and eastern Europe it 
seems that nationalism and nation formation cannot be imputed to these factors since they 
tended to fractionate the emerging economic entities.11 Furthermore, so-called "Eastern 
nationalism" is ethnic and/or cultural rather than constitutional and republican. It is not the 
legitimate offspring of the humanistic Enlightenment but the furious descendant of exclusivist 
19th-century Central European Romanticism.12 
Thus a substitute to the bourgeoisie is required, and it is usually found in various social groups 
and strata. Miroslav Hroch has made the most promising comparative approach, showing the 
importance of intellectuals as producers of national ideologies and patriotic agitators in the case 
of the so-called "small European nations".13 Any complete explanation of the national 
phenomenon has to integrate the fact that the universal domination of the idea of nation as a 
"natural and primordial human community" and the "striving for a world system of nation-
states" cannot be reduced to simple epiphenomena of economic structures and must therefore 
take into account the importance of the powerful discursive strategies that had been able to 
replace the older and more ecumenical (usually religious or dynastic) discourses with 
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nationalism as a dominant narration. A novel symbolic system,14 based on the idea of the world 
as a natural community of nations, substituted the older one, much in the same way that the 
idea of natural law had eliminated the belief in a divine law. Nonetheless, the "social 
constructivist" approach that focuses exclusively on nationalism as a "symbolic revolution" is 
equally reductionist, since it assumes that competing systems of mental representations, 
normative values, and ideological projects have an inherent ability to discipline social action and 
to produce, simply by their symbolic force, complex societal phenomena.15 
A different approach will be attempted hereafter. Its purpose is to examine the material (but not 
only the economic) premises of symbolic action and efficiency, and to understand why, at a 
particular historical moment, various groups of "intellectuals" (I fise this anachronistic term due 
to its convenience) produced, adopted, and diffused an innovating world-view that did not seem 
to be congruous either with the world in which they lived or with the aspirations of their fellow 
countrymen. Their "modern" theoretical discourse, no matter how well articulated and coherent, 
could not have imposed itself against the older "traditional" one if it did not serve the particular 
symbolic and cultural interests of those social groups that were able to "mobilise" themselves 
in order to support it. 
Social groups, political parties and corporate bodies, in general, are produced and 
conceptualised as imagined - thus "materialised" - communities thanks to the constant, not 
voluntarily coherent but structurally oriented, ideological activity of "intellectuals". It is 
intellectuals who are able to articulate the specific particular and corporate interests of the 
dominant social classes and transform them into the general and common world-view of a 
larger community, thus legitimising the domination of the upper classes, securing the 
consensus of the dominated and, last but not least, producing the logical conformism of the 
larger community towards these values and identities. Dominated social groups and strata find 
themselves embedded in the "mental blueprints" which are produced and diffused by the 
"organic" intellectuals of the dominant social bloc. Their identity and self-representation, their 
coordinated action as a group, and the discrete personal/familial strategies of their individual 
members are "products" of their own "organic" intellectuals, yet products bounded by the 
dominant symbolic order.16 
This is not to say that intellectuals are the simple spokesmen of each social group or class, 
since their symbolic efficiency is dependent on their autonomy vis-à-vis specific social groups 
and actors. Intellectuals, both individually and as factional groups, have symbolic and material 
interests of their own, share common group values and rules of mutual interaction and 
competition, and finally have particular stakes ("enjeux") which they fight for. Any novel 
theoretical discourse, such as the national(ist) one in our Greek case, is the product of 
intellectual work and internal competition among the "producers of meaning". Before imposing 
a new world-view on the outside world, the novel discourse must establish its supremacy inside 
the autonomous "field" in which intellectuals are operating.17 The symbolic efficiency of any 
ideological discourse has to be evaluated in the particular circle of intellectuals where it is 
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exposed before we assess its influence on the larger society. Competing factions of 
intellectuals, in order to impose their dominance inside a particular field and mobilise the social 
strata outside this field, usually adopt distinct discursive strategies. The first strives to exert a 
radical critique, shatter the internal coherence, deconstruct the opponent faction's view, and 
delegitimise it as a dominating "doxa" in the particular autonomous intellectual "field". Another 
discursive strategy addresses the surrounding social groups and, taking into consideration their 
particular symbolic needs, produces simplified messages in an idiom understood by them. 
In this text I will examine the Greek case and show how the emerging group of radical republican 
intellectuals, constituted around a novel option for a Hellenic national consciousness, 
formulated two discursive strategies that were successful in delegitimising their intellectual 
opponents and gave new and attractive perspectives to larger social groups. This was 
tantamount to a "symbolic revolution". The fact that they swiftly imposed their view among their 
peers is explained in terms of the particular symbolic interests and material ambitions the 
intellectuals shared in the specific "field" in which they were active. Furthermore, the success 
they had in the surrounding social sphere, in spite of its relative socio-economic archaism, is 
elucidated by the special needs of the social groups to whom they appealed as well as by the 
distinctive historical circumstances in which they acted. Special interest will be given to the 
discursive strategy they elaborated in order to delegitimise their ecclesiastical opponents and 
dominate the "symbolic field". In order to do so they ultimately created a new "field", which I 
will call scientific (or, in their own terminology, "philosophical"). 
Various, conflicting, and sometimes self-contradictory discourses were involved in this process 
and constitute our primary sources. Nevertheless, some notable intellectual figures and texts 
stand out as central to our enterprise. They somehow constitute the theoretical backbone of the 
new symbolic system or the most limpid formulation of the old traditionalist view. Adamantios 
Korais is certainly the most important author18 of this period, as his political and other writings 
shaped the world-view of the largest number of young followers. His definition of Hellenic 
identity and historical narration of the Greek national revival has predominated ever since in 
modern Greece. Although these definitions now seem self-evident and somehow trivial, in his 
time they were viewed as radically novel and controversial. 
Ottoman society and the Christian congregation 
Ottoman society constituted, since the 15th century, a multi-ethnic, multi-confessional and 
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multi-cultural patrimonial empire, its population being classified in institutionalised orders and 
religious congregations (millet) and fractured in multiple corporate bodies (professional 
corporations, territorial communities, privileged family clans and tribal groups). Each of these 
imposed on its members a particular identity and allegiance. Since every Ottoman subject could 
be, and was, a member of more than one order and corporate body, a specific hierarchy of 
identities and allegiances was always an object of negotiation between these bodies and their 
members. There was no common identity that could command or pretend to command a 
primary and indivisible allegiance from all (as a national allegiance requires in our time). 
In this pre-capitalist society the economic sphere was not yet distinct from the social and 
political spheres. Exchange of material goods with symbolic ones was legitimate; particular 
symbolic or cultural goods were normally exchanged for economic goods insofar as they were 
both thought to be compatible with the exchange spheres which they involved.19 Thus economic 
capital could be used to acquire a symbolic good, such as priesthood, an administrative office, 
access to a privileged social group, etc. A Romaic archon household would "purchase" 
priesthood for one of its members and would later acquire an arch-episcopal see, use its social 
prestige to marry another into a rich merchant family, send a youngster to study medicine in 
Padua for a long period, etc. Some goods (symbolic or cultural rather than economic) were 
thought to be monopolised by particular social orders. Only the exchange of goods belonging to 
different spheres or, sometimes, the commerce between persons of different social orders were 
opprobrious and reprehensible. A rich family of notables could legitimately spend a large sum 
of money to assure that a bishop attends a particular ecclesiastical service it commanded 
(wedding, baptism, etc.). In such a case, "buying" and "selling" the holy sacraments were 
legitimate and legal acts (although canon law formally proscribed them). If a parvenu, lay or 
cleric, tried to achieve the same thing by the same means, such an act would be considered 
either illegal or a contemptuous sign of bad taste. The exchange of economic goods with 
symbolic ones was thought to be natural and, even, a bargain for the laity. A career in the Greek-
Orthodox church was, for young upper-class Christians in the post-Byzantine Balkans, one of 
the most convenient ways to secure control of economic and social resources. Access to 
prelacy or priesthood, appointment as bishop or parish-vicar leading to appropriation of 
revenues and to the honors and social and political influence linked to this high position, were 
indispensable parts of any familial strategy that strived to assure the reproduction of its social 
position. The symbolic and social (and to a lesser degree economic) domination of the church 
hierarchy can be paralleled with seigniorial domination in feudal societies.20 It was founded not 
on physical but on symbolic violence, that is on the consensus of the dominated classes thanks 
to the complete domination of the symbolic system by the church. 
In the Ottoman ecumene, Islam dominated institutionally the religious field and constantly 
threatened the Christian churches to deprive them of their flocks. To prevent this fatal 
development and assure the reproduction of their congregations, ecclesiastical lords had 
adopted three distinct strategies. They reinvigorated the church hierarchy in order to concentrate 
its power; they expanded and reinforced the parish system to monitor closely each Christian 
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family unit; and, finally, 
they asked and were given 
a quasi-monopoly on the 
administration of family 
and, partly, of civil law 
inside their religious 
community. These 
"privileges" were 
conferred by the Ottoman 
sultan and, in return, the 
Orthodox hierarchy offered 
its tacit support and 
legitimisation of his rule. 
The political and social order of the Christian congregation in the Ottoman empire was 
ideologically legitimised by the symbolic system which was organised and reproduced around 
the Greek-Orthodox church.21 All spheres of the familial (marriage, divorce, inheritance) and 
social (birth, death, education) life of Greek-Orthodoxs were actually regulated by the church. 
Its symbolic domination was secured thanks to the immaterial arms at its disposition 
(excommunication and its counterpart, indulgence) and to the long and patient ideological work 
of its clerics. Any scientific, cultural and, generally, ideological activity in the Christian 
community was monitored, judged and finally sanctioned or chastised by them. Furthermore, 
any such activity was usually expressed in the particular idiom of religious orthodoxy and was 
certainly limited by its conceptual framework. Religion serves as a cognitive system before it 
can function as a system of mystification.22 It can be said that no independent intellectual or 
scientific career could be pursued outside church control. The rules of intellectual and scientific 
research and behaviour, as well as the specific praise and disavowal of intellectual practices, 
depended on the values, principles and power-relations structured inside the "Christian religious 
field". Very few lay intellectuals can be traced before the second half of the 18th century, and 
these were never independent of church authorities. Most intellectuals were monks and 
clergymen, either descendants of notable families, or men of humble origin, moving upwards 
through the channels of monastic careers23 and ecclesiastical favouritism. It was mostly, but not 
exclusively, the former group that studied in the most distinguished centers of learning, usually 
in Italy or Central Europe, and had a career open in the church hierarchy and the ecclesiastically-
controlled educational system. All intellectual and scientific activity was thus dominated by the 
religious sphere that controlled access, imposed the rules of contact and, ultimately, dictated its 
judgment and values in the dependent educational-scientific "subfield". 
The ideological discourse of the Orthodox prelates was characterised by the preaching of 
"submission", i.e. the legitimisation of Ottoman reign as an expedient of divine providence and 
an instrument in the economy of salvation, which was a fundamental part of ecclesiastical 
narration on history and its meaning.24 This ideological discourse heavily influenced the political 
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and social ideas of the Christian congregation. Furthermore, four centuries of Ottoman 
domination and ecclesiastical symbolic authority had inscribed in the Christian population of the 
empire a new collective "habitus", that is, an active system of corporally embedded pre-
dispositions, cultural practices and mental representations.25 Each social order and group had 
its own distinctive habitus according to the composition of its capital (economic, cultural, 
social, symbolic) and its position in "social space".26 The symbolic representation of the various 
and distinct social and political groups in Ottoman society (as in any other society) resulted 
ultimately from the activity of the "producers of meaning", thus of the intellectuals. The 
production and reproduction of the general consensus on the symbolic order of things in 
Ottoman society, so important for the legitimisation of the political and social status-quo, should 
also be understood as an activity that constituted the social groups themselves. In other words, 
the symbolic representation of political groups and social classes in the Christian congregation 
was an active factor in the reproduction of social relations and ethnic-cultural identities. 
Producers and consumers of "modern" symbolic capital 
in the 18th century 
The 18th century witnessed a fundamental reconfiguration of socio-political and economic 
relations in the Christian community. This of course was an integral part of a larger process, that 
of the integration of the Ottoman world-empire in the capitalist world-economy and world inter-
state system dominated by Western Europe.27 Two new social groups emerged. The first was a 
group of Christian archons (Phanariots) who were co-opted into the Ottoman administrative 
machine as interpreters of the foreign ministry and the admiralty, and later as appointed rulers 
(voyvodes) of the autonomous Moldavian and Valachian principalities.28 The other was a 
dynamic class of financiers, merchants and artisans that were usually engaged in trading with 
the Western world. Both needed a detailed and updated knowledge of Western culture and 
technology (a novel "cultural capital" which was rare in the Ottoman world) and gave 
employment to three groups larger in numbers: lower echelon administrators around the 
Phanariot elite; employees in merchant houses (who were speaking European languages and 
commanding modern accounting and financial techniques); and, finally, the teaching staff 
necessary for the reproduction of this new "cultural capital". Modern curriculum well informed 
of European knowledge (languages, civilisation practices, and cultural goods) was for the first 
time indispensable for a relatively large audience that was constantly growing in numbers and 
importance. 
Only a fraction of the global merchant class was interested in trade with the European world-
economy, while the bulk of church prelates, priests and monks did not need this novel 
curriculum for the reproduction of their specific symbolic and cultural capital.29 The same was 
true for the large number of low-ranking church officials, merchant employees, educators, 
provincial notables, etc. They simply needed an elementary learning of the sacred church 
language (a petrified and archaic form of medieval Greek) and a minimal knowledge of 
arithmetic. Although they formed the majority of the Greek-Christian congregation, their 
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economic and social influence was nonetheless stagnating, while that of the novel social groups 
was rapidly expanding. 
If the consumers of educational goods can be clearly divided into two groups, the producers 
were not so distinctively differentiated. Teachers and intellectuals (of both "modern" and 
"traditional" curricula) came from the same original pool. In the 18th century, an overproduction 
Of candidates for positions in education is observed.30 A learned man had to struggle for a long 
time to secure the position of a well-paid teacher in one of the prominent schools, mostly 
administered by the church hierarchy or the urban communities (that is the merchants and 
notables). During the 18th century a number of "modern schools" were instituted, mainly in the 
Danubian principalities or in towns known for their commercial links with the European 
economy, in order to satisfy the need for a modern "curriculum". Only a small part of the 
teaching population was able to find employment in those well-paid positions in "modern" 
schools, and in order to do so they had to command the novel cultural capital. As a result, 
"traditional" teachers (monks and clerics who did not have the required knowledge) tried to 
block this development by slander and malign accusations against their opponents, that is by 
marginalising them and, on some occasions, by achieving their excommunication.31 A violent 
controversy over the curriculum in schools and - of course - a thinly veiled rivalry over the 
salaries paid to "modern" teachers was a permanent reality in the 18th century. Higher church 
officials and lay notables were not necessarily against modern curriculum. They even openly 
sympathised with its most conservative versions, but could not estrange themselves from the 
larger group of lower rank-and-file members of the church and its congregation who still 
suspected the enlightened intellectuals as schismatic or, God forbid, atheists. 
For their part the few intellectuals who had been associated with this "modern" curriculum were 
obliged to rely for protection on the few (but powerful) enlightened prelates, Phanariots and rich 
merchants whose educational needs they satisfied. They were split into competing factions, and 
fought in order to achieve distinction and fame-and thus in order to dominate-their small, but 
rapidly growing, circle. By competing they even set the agenda that would serve as a common 
platform for mutual understanding and recognition. In the late 18th and early 19th century, the 
"language question" sharply divided them: which was the form of Greek that could better serve 
as a sophisticated medium of communication and education for the Greek Orthodox community 
and the vehicle for the organisation of an enlightened modern Greek culture?32 Although it was 
a contest for power within their small circle, this question served, in a sense, as a medium of 
unification and dissociation from all those who could not grasp the acuity of this problem. 
Through their contention over the rational solution of a common problem, they thus created a 
particular self-identity as enlightened "philosophers" and instituted an internal and autonomous 
hierarchy of distinctions, values, and modes of achieving consensus. Closely dependent for 
their self-definition on the ideas and ideological constructs of the European Enlightenment, they 
could not, in their intellectual pursuit, be separated from its theoretical context and powerful 
drive towards secularisation, political radicalism, and the pursuit of progress. As long as the 
political and social status-quo in Ottoman society was unblemished, their intellectual vagaries 
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were of small importance and did not command any support outside a small circle of initiated 
adherents. They faced the sour everyday life of the isolated enlightened intellectual in a universe 
of ignorance and bigots. Their political agenda was equally timid. 
The nationalist ^symbolic revolution and its context 
Then, in the last quarter of the 18th 
century, after the successful Russian 
war against the Ottoman Port (1768-
1776), military and diplomatic power 
relations in the Balkan peninsula were 
dramatically reversed. For the first 
time, the replacement of the Ottoman 
sultanate by a Greek-Orthodox 
monarchy seemed to be a reasonable 
prospect; a large number of high 
echelon prelates, Phanariots and 
notables, openly sided with the 
Russians,33 and an even larger number 
eagerly awaited a new war to make their move. This novel political situation demanded a new 
and unprecedented political discourse and gave marginal intellectuals of various sides the 
possibility to address a larger audience interested in the prospect of a radically different world-
view. The first and careful calls for a new political order were inspired by the vision of an 
enlightened monarchy and inscribed into a Romaic proto-nationalist project.34 They were related 
to the spread of millenarian rumors and the production and diffusion of popular "prophecies" 
about the imminent fall of the infidel kingdom and the rise of a Greek-Orthodox dynasty.35 All the 
prominent figures of the first and second generations of the Balkan Enlightenment were active 
in that direction.36 The Romaic content and clearly pro-Russian orientation of these texts is well 
established. In some cases, the texts had a militant and revolutionary content as the Iketiria, a 
supplicatory call for the liberation of the "Greeks" (Graikoi) from Ottoman Muslim "despotism", 
and the installation of a Greek-Orthodox monarchy.37 Otherwise these texts were a politically 
uncommitted and serene analysis of the constitution of the "Greek" (or "Romaic" as Katartzis 
called it) nation ("ethnos") as a body politic, with its established historical, religious and cultural 
origins, its political institutions, and ruling social groups. In both kinds of texts "Greeks" or 
"Romioi" were not "Hellenes". They could be "Raskian Greeks", that is Serbs, or any Greek-
Orthodox living south of the Danube. Their identity was "Greek" in its origins, both genealogically 
and religiously, but they could speak and use a host of languages. Yet the "Hellenic heritage" 
was an important element, if not the only one, of their identity. Both in the Iketiria (1772) and in 
Katartzis' works,38 the Hellenic genealogy was not direct and exclusive but one of many 
components, and certainly less important than the religious Greek-Orthodox.39 
The French revolution and its political radicalism were responsible for a new major ideological 
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shift that divided the small circle of enlightened intellectuals and led to an essentially novel 
conceptualisation of the symbolic order in the Greek-Orthodox Christian congregation. A small 
but active group of political activists and patriots (intellectuals, teachers, merchants and some 
Phanariots and notables) proposed and was mobilised by a different collective identity (Hellenic 
and nationalist instead of Romaic and proto-nationalist), a radical political project (a Hellenic 
republic instead of the enlightened Greek-Orthodox monarchy), and a revolutionary societal 
transformation (a clear reference to the liberal and bourgeois ideology of the French revolution). 
Now a clear dissociation of this intellectual and political elite from the official ecclesiastical 
authorities was confirmed. Although their strong anti-clericalism was mitigated by their declared 
individual Christian devotion, it is clear that they considered the Greek-Orthodox faith as a mere 
epiphenomenon of their national identity and used it as a mobilising reference for the illiterate 
masses. 
The understandable hesitation of the social and political heads of the Greek-Orthodox 
community to completely dissociate themselves from the most careful and conservative 
variations of the "modern" discourse, personified by the older generations of Greek 
Enlightenment,40 had left the position of church apologists vacant; this position was now 
occupied by a fervent fundamentalist group that undertook a violent ideological campaign 
against the modern intellectuals and teachers and blamed their protectors on higher echelons. 
The "fundamentalists" (once again a rather anachronistic term used for its convenience) came 
from the same social and intellectual background as many of the enlightened intellectuals and 
educators, but they chose a totally different symbolic strategy in order to dominate the 
ideological arena.41 They formulated an ideological discourse that can be labeled as a clear 
attempt of "retraditionalisation", in the sense given to the term by Clifford Geertz.42 This 
ambitious attempt was initiated at a time of political and diplomatic crisis (the Napoleonic 
campaign in Egypt) and used the occasion to ultimately dominate the Christian religious field, 
that is to control the patriarchal institution and the holy synod.43 
It was against this attempted retraditionalisation that a novel, coherent, powerful and successful 
discourse was immediately asserted and rapidly dominated the ideological sphere. The prudent 
enlightened intellectuals of the older generation, unwilling to commit themselves, both 
intellectually and politically, with either side, had evacuated the "public sphere" and demobilised 
themselves. Their enlightened discourse sounded vacuous when they criticised the radicalism 
of the republicans and their Christian conviction hollow when measured by the yardstick of the 
"re-traditionalists". Their political circumspection was rejected by both sides. In a few years 
such important and formerly respected figures iike Voulgaris, Theotokis, and Katartzis (to 
mention the most prominent) seemed antiquated and were transformed into (living but inert) 
references, strategically manipulated by the conflicting factions.44 
The Enlightenment as a discourse of progress, science and reason was an idiom of social 
criticism and inherently contained a radical political agenda founded on civil equality and 
personal freedom. Its very message opposed the ecclesiastical discourse which was based on 
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a theodicy of submission to religious 
dogma and secular power. The inoculation 
of the new specialised practical or 
scientific knowledge and cultural 
paradigms of the Enlightenment in the 
"traditional" theologico-philosophical 
corpus, which was dominated by the 
Greek-Orthodox Church, had not left the old 
symbolic order and its social foundations 
unshattered. Such an inculcation is not always without an unintended destabilising effect on the 
coherence of the dominant symbolic system, since it requires the adoption of theoretical 
stratagems and the formulation of special codes of transcription.45 Nevertheless, there were 
parts of the enlightened discourse that were simply impossible to insert into the dominant 
religious world view and, in such a case, their proponents were only tolerated as long as they 
did not question the dominant position of the church. On the other hand, the most prudent 
proponents, open to any compromise, diluted the coherence of their discourse and thus risked 
being marginalised and delegitimised, to the benefit of the radicals who wished for an open 
clash (at least symbolically) with the dominant religious ideology. 
The new generation of intellectuals, whom I shall call "radical republicans" in order to 
distinguish them from the larger group of enlightened intellectuals and "modern" teachers, 
articulated a novel Hellenic national idea. This revolutionary project was clearly distinct from the 
earlier timid Romaic calls for an enlightened Greek-Orthodox monarchy. They also demanded 
the acknowledgment that scientific research should have its rules, values and purpose; in other 
words, they strove for the constitution of a separate "scientific field" that, by definition, they 
perceived as independent from and fundamentally superior to the religious sphere. Their 
scientific activity, which produced some fine intellectual achievements, cannot be separated 
from their ideological production. Their scientific discourse included as an ultimate objective, 
and legitimised as a rational expectation,46 the constitution of an independent Hellenic nation-
state, once the large national audience (still unconscious of its "real identity") would be 
educated and, thus, morally prepared to accept their "philosophical" (and accordingly "self-
evident") point of view and assume its consequences, i.e., the obligation to fight for "freedom", 
that is national independence and republican institutions. Republican liberal institutions were 
thought of as ends inseparable from Hellenic national reaffirmation. The matrix of early Hellenic 
nationalism is constructed on the French constitutional model of nation and nationalism. It 
would take three generations of intellectuals and the affirmation of many concurrent Balkan 
"romantic" nationalisms to partly disentangle Hellenic nationalism from its constitutional matrix 
and produce a new rival model out of a powerful blend of romantic nationalism and some of the 
most inane and insipid mytho-moteurs of the old Romaic tradition. 
What differentiated the radical republican nationalist discourse from its timid Romaic 
antecedents was the fact that it produced and rapidly imposed on a large intellectual audience 
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a completely separate national identity and name (the Hellenic) as well as a new historical 
narrative (and a new sense of life) for this national subject, and firmly embedded them in the 
necessary biological metaphors (the nation as a large family, a member of a natural 
commonwealth of nations, etc.). To measure the success of this radical discourse, one simply 
has to notice that in less than twenty-five years even its political opponents had accepted this 
new identity, and the Greek War of Independence was officially conducted in the name of the 
Hellenic nation. 
Korais : producing the Hellenic nation as a subject of history 
The earlier observed cases of the influence of the French revolutionary message and military 
presence in the Balkans were not linked to a novel Hellenic national discourse. When the French 
invaded and captured the Ionian islands (until then under Venetian rule), they had an easy task 
in finding enthusiastic local support, since the peculiar Venetian feudal institutions had grown 
particularly oppressive to the peasants and restrictive to bourgeois economic development. 
Nevertheless, as reflected in two bilingual declarations circulated in the Greek world,47 the 
officially endorsed French ideological propaganda towards Greek-Orthodox Ottoman subjects 
had been careful in transcoding, correcting, and enlarging the Greek part of the text by using the 
traditional Romaic references -despite the fact that French originals had been directly inspired 
by classical references to Hellas and the Hellenic democratic institutions. The "habitants de la 
Gr ce" were translated as "Romaioi tes Ellados" and the most radical national references were 
either obliterated or transformed into traditional calls for a revolt against the infidel "Sultan", the 
"Pope of Rome", etc. Their revolutionary impact on the larger Greek-Orthodox masses was null. 
Another radical national project directly inspired by the French republican example was activated 
by a small group of conspirators headed by Rigas Velestinlis, who is now the archetypal hero 
and martyr of the Greek national movement. He was born in Thessaly, studied in the modern 
curriculum, and started his career in the Phanariot bureaucracy in the Danubian principalities, 
where he proved himself a successful intellectual and author of books of scientific 
popularisation. As a political essayist he was a fervent propagandist of the republican ideas 
inspired by the French revolution. He wrote a widely diffused revolutionary hymn (Thourios), 
published a map of Greece (the 1797 "Charta tes Ellados") which covers the entire Balkan 
peninsula and, finally, secretly printed a brochure entitled A New Political Government, a 
constitution copied from the French model that was to be his revolutionary manifesto. He was 
arrested in Vienna, his brochure confiscated and destroyed, and he was extradited to the 
Ottomans who executed him in Belgrade in 1797 along with his fellow comrades. Although 
Rigas Velestinlis made extensive use of Hellenic democratic references, his political project can 
be understood better in the context of a larger Romaic republican commonwealth, ethnically 
neutral and tolerant of all religious communities.48 
This last revolutionary incident had a larger impact in the Greek-Orthodox community than 
French propaganda. The radical challenge, this time, originated from its internal intellectual 
environment and the patriarchate, led by the conservative and prudent Gregory V, considered it 
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necessary to respond. Early in 1798, Paternal Instruction, a pamphlet written by an unknown 
"fundamentalist" and attributed to Anthimos, the late Patriarch of Jerusalem, was published in 
order to delegitimise the aborted revolutionary movement of Rigas. In this pamphlet the standard 
cosmological narration of history as the recurrent epiphany of Divine Grace to counter the 
designs of Satan (who is omnipresent as the locomotive of history) was exposed once again,49 
endowed with a new final act where the Fallen Angel employs false liberty, promised by its 
instruments, the French revolutionaries and libertines, to incite the Orthodox Christians in civil 
and social disobedience and thus, on the very eve of the Final Judgment, lead them off the road 
to Salvation. In this pamphlet, standard Greek-Orthodox historical and cosmological narration is 
given in full for the last time: Salvation is a collective enterprise led by the Church. The Greek-
Orthodox congregation, substituting itself for the Jews who betrayed Christ, moves in a time 
symbolically filled with Divine Presence towards the end of the Cosmos (the final judgment and 
resurrection of the dead) and its final salvation. The Ottoman dynasty is nothing less than an 
actor in the economy of divine providence; it assures, since its appearance, the just 
disciplinisation and necessary protection of the Greek-Orthodox congregation. The pamphlet 
addresses all audiences. After the first part which discussed the principles of cosmological 
history for all readers, a second part targeting the intellectual elite was meant to examine the 
question of "real and false liberty" from a "philosophical" point of view, using Aristotelian 
categories to classify political regimes and establish the relationship between the corrupted 
political regimes and false liberty. Finally a long poem addressed the humblest and less 
sophisticated readership and exposed the necessity of a secular socio-political order organised 
around the same principles as the eternal cosmic order. This transcendental order, sanctified by 
God's example as protecting Father and Absolute Ruler, is exemplified in Nature and its rigorous, 
hierarchical, and ever-unchangeable order. The natural world provides thus the loci of 
metaphors that will demonstrate to the semi-literate the necessity of economic inequality, 
social-hierarchical discipline, and political absolutism. The "naturalisation" of socio-political 
order and its sanctification was the primary political object of the Paternal Instruction. 
A few months later, in the Fraternal Instruction, his first political booklet, Adamantios Korais 
(1798), who was already a celebrated classicist, responded to this fundamentalist pamphlet. In 
this and other political brochures that followed in the next five years, he expounded a view of 
history that was radically incompatible with the religious one. History was to be understood as 
the voyage of a 
secular vessel (the 
"Hellenic" nation) 
through a serial and 
tamed historical time, 
empty of any divine or 
satanic presence. A 
rational and inevitably 
national-republican 
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future was proclaimed as its ultimate end. The Hellenic nation was explicitly named (Hellenic 
instead of Romaic or Grecian), given a detailed history,50 and considered as part of a larger 
world of democratic nations51 voluntarily composed of individuals. Enlightened education was 
the only way in which individuals could gain consciousness of their national identity and, as a 
result, strive to achieve the independence of a Hellenic republic, where a place is reserved for 
all citizens without discrimination of faith or class. Korais's nation is clearly a constitutional 
conglomeration of free individuals and not yet a collective subject with anthropomorphic and 
immanent characteristics. References52 to biological descent and collective characteristics 
(nation as family that we do not choose, etc.) are no more than descriptive metaphors and do 
not yet carry any essentialist or immanent meaning. The Christian affiliation was never negated; 
it had actually been transformed into a contingent and descriptive characteristic of the "Hellenes 
of the present time." 
Korais used the "syntactic structures" of ecclesiastical narration to legitimise a novel vocabulary 
and rearrange the symbolic order. He manipulated, as many nationalists after him, various pre-
national Romaic mytho-moteurs in order to invest his novel narration with the symbolic 
respectability of repeated myths. The symbolic efficiency of his message should not be 
measured against its diffusion (which is impossible to estimate) among the popular and illiterate 
masses, but against its influence on the intellectual products of his disciples, colleagues, and 
opponents. In 1811, Perdikaris denigrated Rigas Velestinlis' political plans but used, almost 
without any alteration, Korais's historical narration of the fall of the Greek nation.53 Hereafter, 
many of Korais's bitter opponents had to think in his terms of a world of nations and their rights. 
Delegitimising the symbolic opponent 
Korais was very sensitive to the effort of the author of the Paternal Instruction to specifically 
address the "philosophers" by using their specialised vocabulary to convince them of the 
incompatibility of false liberty with righteous Aristotelian political regimes. But he refused 
altogether to enter into a debate with a "theologian" over liberty and philosophy. He was the first 
to deny to the church prelates and theologians any right to have an authoritative opinion on 
"philosophy", by which he understood almost all our scientific disciplines. As for himself, he 
implicitly considered having the right to an authoritative opinion on matters of religion and faith; 
he thus openly rebuked any special monopoly of the church hierarchy on the interpretation of 
the holy scriptures.54 It was a complete inversion of the existing symbolic hierarchy, where the 
theologians and the church prelates had the obligation and the right to censure and indict the 
philosophers. Korais and his followers were now indicting them as falsifiers of the holy scripts 
and "traitors" in the service of an infidel and tyrannical despot. 
Adamantios Korais55 was not the only one who asked for a complete separation of philosophy 
and theology.56 He was certainly the most radical and served as a model for a generation of 
republican intellectuals. In a few years, a number of booklets were printed that violently attacked 
the established socio-political status-quo and symbolic order.57 These publications must have 
been just part of the intellectual struggle also traced in some diffuse or then unpublished 
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and educational policy in Greek-Orthodox schools operating in the largest and richest Ottoman 
cities.59 Their common denominator was their radical republican content (variations on the 
themes already touched on by Korais), on the one hand, and their coherent strategy of 
delegitimisation of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, on the other. I will concentrate on the essential 
nucleus of the second aspect since the first is already known and largely exposed. 
The prelates were accused of being hypocritical like the Pharisees and profiteers like the 
Publicans. False Christians living like cruel, depraved, and rapacious feudal lords.60 False 
pastors leading their Christian flock to submission to an infidel monarch.61 Profiteers who use 
their sacred ministry to accumulate money and trade their grace for material goods and 
services.62 Republican intellectuals had delegitimised their ecclesiastical opponents as unworthy 
manipulators of sacred goods by making parallel reprimands about the sexual vices of prelates 
and abbots.63 The sexual depravity of the latter was symbolically equated to their 
desacralisation. Contrary to Christian dogma,64 the perceived personal immorality of prelates 
became a negative marker of their sacerdotal purity and, thereafter, of their symbolic legitimacy 
as social and political authorities. 
A main target of this discourse was the weaponry of symbolic constraint used by church 
prelates, such as the powers of excommunication and indulgence that had proved to be 
formidable means of social disciplinisation and symbolic domination.65 Another dual target was, 
on the one hand, the ideological control exerted on Greek-Orthodox Christians through formal 
education and, on the other, the influence of the monks who were ultimately viewed as the main 
vehicles of superstition and obscurantism in society in general and in education in particular. 
Education was considered the royal road to enlightenment, material progress, and national 
consciousness. At the same time, employment in schools was the main, if not the only, means 
of living of most intellectuals, either "modern" or traditional. Fight over its control was vital, and 
the main opponents of the young radical intellectuals were the conservative teachers recruited 
mainly from among monks. Educational obscurantism was again equated with national treason. 
Christian tyrants were constantly paralleled to the Ottoman pashas, both enemies of rationalism, 
education, and political freedom. This rhetoric was not by itself new but, integrated into a 
national political program, suddenly acquired a remarkable symbolic efficiency.66 Although 
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writers were careful to differentiate between the many virtuous prelates and the few but 
influential and ignominious "Pharisees", this last group served to construct the standard image 
of the high ecclesiastical authorities. 
In spite of extreme cases of personal depravity, these seigniorial manners of ecclesiastical and 
lay notables were, until that time, neither novel nor socially reprehensible, since they were 
embedded in the legitimately differentiated transactional spheres I have already described as 
well as in the legitimised political compromise established since the 14th century between 
Christian ecclesiastical and lay archons and the Ottoman Porte. The new national and bourgeois 
morality demanded by the radical republican intellectuals asked for public and individual virtue 
to be shown by every archon, ecclesiastical or lay. Furthermore, it proposed a radically different 
distinction of the transactional spheres. Symbolic goods (the holy sacraments and ministerial 
grace) became free gifts that were individually pursued and granted. Material goods were (or 
more likely should be) evaluated in the free market against other compatible goods. 
The monopoly of distinction (between moral and immoral, exchangeable and non-exchangeable 
goods) was recognised as the domain of free and rationally thinking individuals. In reality it was 
a domain monopolised by the distinguished manipulators of "rationality" and "science": that is 
the open circle of "philosophers" with its rational rules and virtuous values. Of course this 
autonomous field was to be independent of church dominance. A much repeated demand of the 
enlightened intellectuals and, more urgently, of the radical republicans was precisely the 
independence of philosophy from theology and the concomitant monopolisation of education. A 
second social reform demanded by many of the intellectuals67 was the transformation of the 
church into a public salaried bureaucracy subordinate to the "modern" and "scientific" state 
envisioned by philosophers. These two reforms would be rapidly materialised after the 
constitution of an independent Hellenic nation-state under the direction of some of the most 
distinguished radical intellectuals. The autocephalous (independent) Hellenic church would 
become a nationalised institution closely monitored and controlled by the state authorities while 
education, totally cut off from church influence, would be no less nationalised in form and 
content. 
Conclusion 
Both Korais' historical narration and symbolic construction of Hellenic national self-identity and 
his disciples' assertions about the ambivalent position of ecclesiastical authorities under 
Ottoman rule, are now aspects of self-evident "national truisms" in Greece. They became rapidly 
popular in the lifetime of their first advocates while their reform program was adopted by the 
young Hellenic nation-state and the radical intellectuals themselves took an active part in the 
building of its educational and ecclesiastical institutions. The symbolic efficiency of the 
nationalist rhetoric, which entailed the dissolution of the former symbolic system (ecumenical, 
religious and dynastic world-view, accepting the functioning of different and overlapping 
transactional spheres) should be understood and explained on two levels. Their ideological 
efficiency stemmed from the internal interests of the growing circle of modern intellectuals and 
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teachers. The constitution and autonomous function of an independent scientific "field" and the 
monopolisation of the educational system and its symbolic and economic resources, explain the 
rapid consensus built among the interested intellectuals, especially younger ones. This novel 
contention better served the specific interests (material, cultural and symbolic) of the larger part 
of their colleagues (the "modern" teachers and enlightened intellectuals) and thus, once 
expressed, echoed loudly among them. The swift success of the new nationalist discourse 
outside the narrow group of intellectuals, which we can describe as an "extra-field" 
consequence, and which is more important on the macro-historical level, demands another kind 
of explanation. 
Once the Greek War of Independence was initiated, the nationalist political project appealed 
better to the interests of many powerful figures of the Romaic community. I do not imply a direct 
causal link between nationalism and a hypothetical bourgeoisie striving for the revolutionary 
political unification of an already existent economic sphere which adequately explains this 
phenomenon. On the contrary, this revolt did not serve the economic interests of the larger 
number of merchants and of the high Phanariot class. The groups that were better mobilised 
were the local and provincial notables and armed militia leaders and, finally, all those who had 
gambled on the fall of the Ottoman power. The nationalist political and symbolic discourse, 
articulated by a small but militant intellectual group, could mobilise them, and give them a sense 
of common territorial identity (the war was ultimately fought in southern Greece) as well as a 
supplementary power project compatible with their own political interests: the constitution of a 
state that could be part of the world inter-state system, both functionally and ideologically. This 
political discourse both secured growing support by European philhellenes, since it was 
recognizable by them, and it could and did make ample use of the old Romaic rhetoric. This 
rhetoric was strategically manipulated (even distorted) by radical republicans, provincial 
notables and rebel leaders, but it was always subordinate to the dominant national ideology. It 
served well those who gained and held power, since this rhetoric legitimised the new allocation 
of power. After the formal dissolution of all legal corporate bodies mediating between the 
modern state and the new citizen, state-power was more concentrated, penetrating deeper into 
the structures of everyday life and sociability, exerting unparalleled social and mental control. 
The illiterate peasants and rebels themselves did incorporate parts of this "modern" symbolic 
discourse into their vocabulary and used it to express their own demands.68 The Greek War of 
Independence secured for them free access to the land, and the Hellenic nationalist rhetoric 
provided them (before, during, and after the war) with a new sense of identity, justice, and social 
position, that is, a new "sociodicy". The new politically dominant classes found an 
incomparable power resource that could give meaning to their social position and assure social 
cohesion. Nationalism took the place of religion as the key reference in the new symbolic 
system that legitimated the political and social status-quo, gave coherence to the self image of 
all social groups (themselves articulated as groups thanks to the symbolically efficient work of 
intellectuals) and relative stability to the paramount political institutions. One can add that for a 
large number of well-educated Phanariots, the young state proved (as expected) a valuable 
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source of political distinction, social reproduction, and economic benefits. The merchant class 
was probably the social group that profited less from the war and from the constitution of the 
young nation-state, but nonetheless it adhered earlier and more eagerly than any other social 
group to the ideological discourse of Hellenic nationalism. The new Hellenic identity was almost 
imposed on this group by their bitter professional rivals in the first half of the 19th century: the 
European merchants and state powers in the Mediterranean commercial world.69 This novel 
identity proved to be a powerful social marker that permitted them to integrate more successfully 
into the world market and the different European host societies as a distinguishable, compact, 
and yet acceptable and modern social group. 
The radical republican intellectuals and the support they mobilised during the war of 
independence were able to overthrow religious domination in the symbolic system of Greek 
society, but they were unwilling to further radicalise their anti-clerical and anti-religious stance. 
Any such radicalisation would endanger the project of nation-building since the new body politic 
was not formed (as in Western Europe) inside a culturally homogeneous and economically 
integrated territorial entity in which instituted social markers and political privileges were 
crushed without putting in danger its overall social cohesion. On the contrary, the body politic 
was formed and expanded in a culturally polymorphous society by transforming religious 
difference into a national marker. It was later, well into the 19th century, when such an endeavor 
met the competition of other Balkan nationalisms, that the linguistic and cultural component 
became the dominant marker. 
Contrary to the view of Stokes,70 the rapid success of Hellenic nationalism was not the mimetic result 
of a process of ideological diffusion of Western ideas into Balkan realities, but rather the unique and 
unintended outcome of a complex internal development in a society experiencing its integration into 
the expanding European world economy and inter-state system. It was a contingent development that 
was enacted by incidental acts, but that was embedded in structured potentialities. The construction 
of a powerful Hellenic national identity and its successful inoculation into different social strata was just 
one of these potential historical trajectories. A Romaic national identity (foreign to the Hellenic and 
republican one) could have been imposed as a solution, or the whole process of the development of 
a Hellenic nationalism could have been delayed for some decades as happened in the Bulgarian case. 
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